Introduction
It has been observed in the literature (Klima (1964) , Horn (1976 Horn ( , 1972 , Ladusaw (1980) , Linebarger (1981) , Progovac (1994) , Dayal (1998) , Kadmon and Landman (1993) , Lee and Horn (1994) , Horn (2000) , Giannakidou (2001) , etc.) that environment-sensitive English any has two major uses, depending on the context in which it occurs: it can function as a negative polarity item, as in (1), or it can be used as a free choice item, as in (2). 1
(1) a. He doesn't like any cat. Existential any in (1a) has been termed PS (polarity-sensitive) any or an NPI (negative polarity item), while any with a universal reading in (2a) has been dubbed FC (free choice) any in the literature. It has been suggested that any has a free choice interpretation in generic contexts and an existential interpretation in polarity contexts. It is a matter of great research and debate whether existential any and universal any are two distinct lexical items or two variants of a single lexical item.
b. ﹁∃(x)
There have been proposed a homonymy account of any in the literature including Klima (1964) , Horn (1976 Horn ( , 1972 , Ladusaw (1980) , Linebarger (1981) , Progovac (1994) , Dayal (1998) , etc. There has also been put forth a univocal account of any, which was seriously researched by Kadmon andLandman (1993) , Lee and Horn (1994) , Horn (2000) , Giannakidou (2001) , and so on.
In this context, special focus is given on the uses of any in inherently negative predicate constructions, as shown below. 2 1 Negative polarity items and free choice items in English include the following.
(i) any, anyone, anybody, anything
In addition, anywhere, any longer, any more, ever are included in the NPIs or FCIs in English. This paper, however, focuses on the items in (i). The items in (i) are listed as NPIs and FCIs in a Wikipedia article. 2 The grammaticality judgments on these examples were provided by several American and Canadian professors in Korea. A couple of non-native speakers of English, including Kim (1999) , assume ungrammaticality for the use of any in such examples as "The witness denied any allegations" or "The professor doubted any explanation". Several Canadian and American professors agreed that these sentences are syntactically fine, but semantically insufficient. In other words, these sentences need more semantic information, but they are syntactically fine. e. The officer denied any wrongdoing.
In Section 2, we will review major analyses of any in the literature and show that they have their own theoretical shortcomings or they have their limitations in dealing with the uses of any in inherently negative predicate constructions. We will show that Giannakidou's (2001) theory excels other analyses in explaining the idiosyncratic behavior of any in Section 2.5. In Section 3, modifying Giannakidou's analysis, I will put forth the Licensing Conditions on any and show that the overall behavior of any including its uses in inherently negative predicate constructions is well-explained in terms of the Licensing Conditions suggested.
Previous major analyses
We will critically review some previous major analyses of any in this section, and see that they have their own theoretical shortcomings. Revising Giannakidou's analysis, I will put forth the Licensing Conditions on any in Section 3.
Ladusaw (1980)
Considering negative-polarity any as an existential quantifier and FC any as a universal one, Ladusaw argues that NPIs can be licensed in a downward entailing environment.
b. d is a trigger for NPIs in its scope iff d is downward-entailing.
Observing that downward-entailing environments include negation (not, rarely, unlikely) , the relative clause headed by a universal quantifier, etc., Ladusaw argues that NPIs are licensed in these environments.
(5) a. John didn't eat a green vegetable.
b. John didn't eat Brussels sprouts.
c. John didn't eat any green vegetable.
As Brussels sprouts are a subset of green vegetables, the negation clauses are downward entailing, and hence license NPIs, according to Ladusaw.
If-clauses in the conditionals and before-clauses also provide downward-entailing environments, as can be seen below.
(6) a. If you have a pet, you will get in free.
→ If you have a cat, you will get in free.
b. If you have any pet, you will get in free.
(7) a. He left before she had eaten a green vegetable.
→ He left before she had eaten kale.
b. He left before Mary had eaten any vegetable.
Any is licensed in the if-clause in (6b) and the before-clause in (7b), as they are downward entailing.
However, a problem with Ladusaw's approach is noted by Lee andHorn (1994:18-19) .
(8) a. Bill saw a boy at no time.
b. Bill saw a boy with brown hair at no time.
c. *Bill saw anybody at no time.
(8c) is a downward-entailing context, as evidenced by the entailment relationship between (8a) and (8b). (8a) entails (8b), and therefore x in Bill saw x at no time is within the scope of a downward entailing trigger. Thus, the ungrammaticality of (8c) poses a problem for Ladusaw's downward entailing theory. This in turn means that Ladusaw's (1980) theory of NPI-licensing is lacking in a relevant syntactic condition.
In addition, Progovac (1994: 134) 
Kadmon and Landman (1993)
Following on the analysis of quantificational variability of ordinary indefinites in Lewis (1975) , Kamp (1981) , and Heim (1982) , Kadmon and Landman (1993) argue for a univocal account of any as an indefinite. They propose that an NP of the form any CN should be regarded semantically as the corresponding indefinite NP with some additional characteristics contributed by any (widening and strengthening).
(9) a. any CN = the corresponding indefinite NP a CN with additional semantic/pragmatic characteristics (widening, strengthening)
contributed by any.
b. WIDENING
In an NP of the form any CN, any widens the interpretation of the common noun phrase (CN) along a contextual dimension.
c. STRENGTHENING
Any is licensed only if the widening that it induces creates a stronger statement, i.e., only if the statement on the wide interpretation ⇒ the statement on the narrow interpretation. (K&L 1993: 357, 361, 369) Kadmon and Landman suggest that in the case of free choice any, the NP is the corresponding indefinite interpreted generically. It should be noted here that the condition in (9c), "only if the statement on the wide interpretation ⇒ the statement on the narrow interpretation" is equivalent to "only if the statement with any CN entails the statement with a CN".
Consider their idea in the following statement.
(10) I don't have any potatoes.
(10) can be represented as something like (11). In context, we can understand 'potato' to mean 'cooking potato' and then (11) would mean that I have no cooking potatoes. Any widens the interpretation of potato, for example, to include decorative potted potatoes, in which case (11) would mean that I don't even have potted potatoes. Now, any is licensed in (10), because the widening that it induces makes the statement expressed by (10), viz., the statement given in (11), stronger -(11) on the wide interpretation of potato entails (11) on the narrow interpretation of potato.
(12) wide: I don't have potatoes, cooking or other.
⇒ narrow: I don't have cooking potatoes.
Consider their approach again in the following sets of sentences. c. John didn't talk to a woman.
c'. John didn't talk to any woman.
As is illustrated in (13a), A is a proper subset of B. The ordinary indefinite would quantify over A, while the any indefinite would quantify over B. As (13b) One of the goals of this paper is to give a full-fledged account of the uses of any in inherently negative predicate constructions. What matters here is that inherently negative predicates hardly have a tendency to take a CN as their object, as shown in (20a) 
and (21a). And a CN does not have a generic interpretation in (22a). A green
vegetable in that sentence can only refer to one specific green vegetable. Thus, the correlation between generic interpretations of indefinites and universal force of FC any may not hold in the cases of inherently negative predicate constructions. Overall, the tie between generic interpretations of indefinites and acceptable contexts for free choice any that they argue for seems elusive.
Lee and Horn (1994)
Lee and Horn note similar patterns of indefinite phrases and any-phrases and propose that any is an indefinite determiner with incorporated even, regarding NPI any as existential indefinite and FC any as a generic indefinite. According to them, any contains an incorporated even, which presupposes the existence of an appropriate scale in the discourse context.
They take note of several common properties of a NP and any CN: the alternation between existential and generic readings, conjunctive interpretation of or for both an indefinite NP and any CN, the same scope phenomena, the ability to be unselectively bound by an operator, etc.
Let us consider these common properties shared by a NP and any CN below.
(23) a. I didn't see a cat.
b. I didn't see any cat.
(24) a. A cat can jump over the wall.
b. Any cat can jump over the wall.
A cat and any cat are interpreted existentially in (23) and generically or universally in (24).
(25) I didn't see an otter or a beaver.
= I didn't see an otter and I didn't see a beaver.
(26) I didn't see any otter or any beaver.
= I didn't see any otter and I didn't see any beaver.
As is seen in (25-26), two or more indefinite expressions coordinated by or allow conjunctive interpretation in the environments in which any is licensed.
(27) a. I didn't buy any cat. Their assumption that NPI any is an existential indefinite and FC any is a generic indefinite explains another property shared by both any and a, namely, scope interpretation with respect to negation and modal operators. When they occur in a negative sentence and are interpreted existentially, both a CN and any CN take narrow scope with respect to negation as in (27) . On the other hand, when they are interpreted generically, an indefinite and any take wide scope with respect to negation or a modal operator, as in (28-29).
On the basis of the assumption that any is even + a, they draw the conclusions stated in (30). (34) a. There isn't any person available now.
b. There isn't even a single person available now.
(35) a. There isn't any food in the refrigerator.
b. There isn't even the least bit of food in the refrigerator.
On the other hand, they suggest that any associated with a kind scale may be paraphrased by even + (contextually appropriate) superlative, as in (36-37).
(36) a. I like any apple.
b. I like even the least delicious apple.
(37) a. Any puppy is cute.
b. Even the ugliest puppy is cute.
I agree with Lee and Horn's analysis of any as an indefinite. However, there is a problem with their theory. According to (30a), a sentence with any CN presupposes the existence of a pragmatic scale of a particular sort, but not all any phrases have a quantity or kind scale, as shown in (38).
(38) a. Press any key.
b. You can take any elevator to come to our office.
For the sentence (38a), it is not very possible to construct a scale of keys. The speaker invites the hearer to randomly press a key. The same holds for (38b), where the hearer is encouraged to randomly choose an elevator to come to the speaker's office, and there may not be a quantity or kind scale of elevators. In short, their assumptions per se may not be adequate to handle the use of any with existential readings. Dayal (1998: 447) argues that any phrases are universal quantifiers whose domain of quantification is the set of possible individuals of the relevant kind, rather than a set of particular individuals. She claims that any is appropriate only in contexts which provide vagueness about the individuals assumed to have the relevant property.
Dayal (1998)
(39) a. b. *You must pick any flower in this bed.
The only difference between (40a) and (40b) is that the set of flowers to be picked are not contextually determined in the former case as the speaker has no idea which flowers will be seen by the hearer. In the latter case, the command is about a contextually determined set and the speaker knows in advance the flowers that will be picked in any world where the command is fulfilled. Therefore, (40b) is ruled out as a violation of contextual vagueness as is spelled out in (39).
Consider the following sentences.
(41) *Yesterday John talked to any woman.
(42) Yesterday John talked to any woman he saw.
Unlike the sentences (40a-b), contextual vagueness is satisfied in (41-42), but (41) talk, we might take the interval of the relative clause to be the same as that of the main clause. That is, the assertion is about possible situations that are temporally bounded. There is no conflict in presuppositions and any becomes acceptable in (42).
Consider the following sentence from Giannakidou (2001: 727) (43) (John is participating in a contest) *There were rumors that 10 women would participate in the contest and that they would stay at the same hotel with John. *By 10 pm yesterday, John kissed any of them.
Giannakidou notes that we would expect an improvement in this sentence by Dayal's explanation, since (a) now we exclude the women situations which do not overlap with John's existence and we only consider the women situations which overlap with
John's participation in the contest, and (b) contextual vagueness is obeyed: we have no idea who the women were, or if they indeed arrived at the hotel. The occurrence of any, however, is still not good in (43). She argues that the failure here is that of excluding polarity items on purely pragmatic grounds.
(44) a. *The defendant denied anything.
b. The defendant denied any allegations.
Contextual vagueness is observed in both (44a) and (44b), but (44a) (i) A propositional operator Op is veridical iff 〚Op p〛c = 1 → 〚p〛= 1 in some epistemic model ME (x) ∈ c; otherwise Op is nonveridical.
(ii) A nonveridical operator Op is antiveridical iff 〚Op p〛c = 1 → 〚p〛= 0 in some epistemic model ME ( Regarding the licensing of any in examples like (i) below, it is generally assumed that the modal operator attached to the sentence licenses the polarity item. For example, Zwarts (1995) assumes that any is licensed in a modal environment in (ii), which is the logical form of (i).
(i) Any repairman can fix my car.
(ii) ◇[∀x (x = repairman) (x fix my car)] Ginnakidou (2001: 665, 708) argues that free choice items are intensional indefinites which do not have their own quantificational force and whose quantificational force is determined by an intensional quantificational operator (Q-operator). In other words, the quantificational force of an FCI is dependent on that of the Q-operator that binds it.
(iii) Q-OPERATOR[w, x] [. . . any-NP (x, w) . . . ]
She assumes that if the binding operator has existential force, as permissive and epistemic can, any will be interpreted existentially; but if the operator is universal or other (e.g., generic, a Q-adverb like always, rarely, usually, etc., a universal modal verb, the maximality operator in comparatives) any will receive the corresponding Q-force. Thus, according to Giannakidou, any as in (i) is licensed in the scope of a Q-operator in a logical form like (iii). (i) α is in the scope of a nonveridical operator β; and (ii) S is not episodic.
She assumes that the world and individual variables of an intensional indefinite must be bound by an operator that has the ability to bind such variables (a Q-operator, i.e. a generic, habitual, modal, intensional operator). According to her, in an affirmative episodic sentence a FCI is ungrammatical because no such operator is present, so the world variable of the FCI remains unbound rendering the FCI uninterpretable and thus ungrammatical.
Observing the distinct paradigms between any and the Greek PIs, she proposes the following condition for any.
(50) Condition regulating the distribution of any (i) Any will not be grammatical in a sentence if any is interpreted in the scope of a veridical expression β in S.
(ii) In certain cases, clause i can be voided if S gives rise to a negative implicature.
She assumes that any is anti-licensed by veridicality. She argues that in order to be grammatical a PI must not be in the scope of a veridical operator, but it does not allow the strong prediction that any should appear in all nonveridical environments, although it will appear in most of these.
The occurrences of any that are problematic for Ladusaw, Kadmon and Landman, Lee and Horn, and Dayal can be explained under Giannakidou's approach.
The occurrence of any in (8c) is judged infelicitous, as it is not in the scope of negation, the nonveridical operator. 4 The occurrences of any in (14a-b), which are a problem for Kadmon andLandman's approach, are felicitous, as any in these examples is in the scope of the modal operators. Any in (38a-b), the tricky cases for Lee andHorn, can be handled under her approach, since any is in the scope of the imperative operator in (38a), and the polarity item is in the scope of the permissive modal in (38b). Dayal's account based on presupposition failure to handle any in It is evident that the comparatives in (51a-b) are veridical because each of the sentences has a truth value. In other words, we can be committed to the truth of the proposition introduced by each of the sentences. Furthermore, the comparatives above are all episodic. In (51a), getting more excited than any other pop artist in the world at the time of his video having the most views on Youtube is an episodic event, but any is licensed. The same reasoning extends to another comparative in (51b). Reaching the finish line earlier is an episodic event, but any is still admitted.
It is also assumed that the comparatives in (51a-b) do not give rise to a negative implicature. It thus follows that the Condition in (50i) is flawed in this regard.
Furthermore, the non-episodicty condition on sentences with FCIs in (49ii) may not 4 (50i) is, in essence, equivalent to (49i) in most cases.
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apply to all the sentences with FC any, since any is allowed in episodic contexts as in (51a-b).
Let us turn to inherently negative predicate constructions.
(52) a. *The defendant denied anything.
c. He denied any fraudulent allegations.
d. He denied any allegations of fraud.
e. The officer denied any wrongdoing.
Giannakidou (1999: 404) argues for indirect licensing as the licensing of NPIs and
APIs by a negative implicature in the spirit of Linebarger (1980 Linebarger ( , 1987 , in the absence of an apparent nonveridical or antiveridical trigger.
(53) a. Only Theodora saw anybody.
b. Theodora regrets that she talked to anybody.
(54) a. Nobody other than Theodora saw anybody.
b. Theodora wishes that she had not talked to anybody.
The sentences in (53a-b) are veridical. Any, on the other hand, is allowed to occur in the complement of a 'negative' emotive factive, as in (53b), and in the scope of only in (53a). Hence according to Linebarger, the negative implicatures in (54a-b)
can create an appropriate environment for any. Thus, anybody is licensed in the scope of nobody in (54a) and in the scope of not in (54b).
Then, under the approaches by Linebarger and Giannakidou, the constructions in (52a-b) can have the negative implicatures represented in (55a-b).
(55) a. The defendant did not admit anything.
b. The defendant did not admit any allegations.
Negation not, which is located in the head of Negation Phrase, c-commands any in the complement position of the verb admit in (55b). Thus, any is in the scope of the nonveridical operator not in (55b), which is the negative implicature for (52b). Under this approach, however, the unacceptability of anything in (52a) is a mystery, since anything is also in the scope of the nonveridical operator not in (55a), the negative implicature for (52a). It thus follows that the uses of any in inherently negative predicate constructions may not be properly handled by the negative implicature analysis. I will handle the uses of any in inherently negative predicate constructions in the next section.
Let us turn to Chung's (2010) approach to the uses of any. Viewing any as a free choice indefinite, Chung (2010:278) suggests that free choice, the basic semantics of any, plays a crucial role in licensing English any.
(56) Free Choice Condition
Any is licensed when the proposition containing any provides a contextually relevant set of possible entities denoted by any, and there is no pragmatic restriction in choosing an entity, regardless of its type, from the set.
Consider (57a-b) and (58a-b) from his perspective.
(57) a. Tom used to eat any food.
b. John talked to any woman who came up to him.
(58) a. *Ten minutes ago, Tom ate any food.
b. *John talked to any woman this morning.
He assumes that habituality in (57a) signifies many events regularly repeated in the past, so the speaker can freely choose an entity that Tom used to eat from a contextually relevant set of possible entities denoted by any, satisfying the Free Choice Condition in (56). The habituality in (57a) contrasts with the non-habituality expressed in (58a), which rules out the use of any. Tom's eating food took place at one point a while ago in (58a), so one cannot feely choose from a set an entity for the food that Tom ate a while ago. This is in violation of the FCC and prevents any from appearing felicitously in (58a). Chung argues that the subtrigged any-phrase in (57b) suggests that John's talking to a woman took place many times. This makes any woman in (57b) satisfy the FCC. In contrast, non-subtrigged any in (58b) comes with an episodic time adverb this morning. Therefore, the event in (58b) took place at some point this morning, so there is no freedom in choosing from a set an entity for a woman that John talked to this morning. This is in violation of the FCC.
Based on free choice derived from the semantics of a free choice indefinite, Chung proposes the Free Choice Condition to handle the uses of any in English without resorting to any syntactic condition.
However, habituals and subtrigging are taken to be nonveridical by Giannakidou (2002:10) .
With regard to habituals, it is not the case that p is true at all the contextually relevant t' ⊆ t, as is represented in (59). Therefore, habituals are assumed to be nonveridical. As for subtrigging, Quer (1998 Quer ( , 2000 proposes an analysis of this construction as an underlying conditional structure, where the content of the relative clause functions as the restriction of the implicit conditional operator. 5 In this account, a sentence like (57b) will have the structure schematized in (60).
The only universal quantifier here is provided by the postulated conditional operator; the any phrase is an indefinite bound by that operator. As a result, subtrigged any phrases are interpreted universally. In this account, the presence of a relative clause is crucial in that it provides the restriction of the conditional. As is widely known, 5 Davidson (1980) interprets the subtrigged any-phrase in (ia) as the conditional in (ib) below (i) a. We let in at 4 o'clock anyone who knew the password. b. If anyone knew the password, we let him in at 4 o'clock.
Along similar lines, Quer (2000:258) assumes that the subtrigged any-phrase in (iia) is equivalent to the conditional in (iib) in interpretation.
(ii) a. He talked to any woman who approached him. b. If any woman approached him, he talked to her.
Thus, the sentence with subtrigged any in (iiia) is assumed to have a logical form like (iiib), and any is licensed in the scope of the conditional operator in (iiib).
(iii) a. John talked to any woman who came up to him. b. If any woman came up to him, John talked to her.
conditionals are taken to be nonveridical (Giannakidou 2001: 16) . Therefore, the uses of any in (57a) and (57b) are well-explained via Giannakidou's Condition, since any is in the nonveridical contexts.
Let us consider the followings with regard to Chung's Free Choice Condition.
(61) a. *Bill saw anybody at no time.
b. *Anybody cannot solve the problem.
(62) *The plaintiff denies anything
In (61a), Bill's seeing nobody took place several times in the past, so the speaker can freely choose an entity from a contextually relevant set of possible entities denoted by anybody and make the proposition in (61a) hold, satisfying the FCC. The same logic applies to (61b), and the FCC is satisfied in that sentence. "The plaintiff's denying"in (62) denotes the person's disposition or habitual action, so one can freely choose an entity from a set and make the proposition in (62) hold. Thus the FCC is also met in (62). However, the polarity items are ruled out in these sentences. Thus, all these examples run counter to Chung's Free Choice Condition.
What we are witnessing here is the failure of excluding any on purely pragmatic/discourse grounds.
Licensing conditions on Any
Let us consider again inherently negative predicate constructions below, repeated from (52).
(63) a. *The defendant denied anything.
We noted in the previous section that the uses of any in inherently negative predicate constructions may not be properly handled by the negative implicature analysis. Giannakidou (2001:673) Any is grammatical in a sentence S iff:
(i) any is in the scope of a nonveridical operator β in a nonveridical context; and any does not c-command β.
(ii) free choice can be made from a contextually relevant set of possible entities denoted by free choice any.
(c-command here is m-command)
I argue for a univocal account of any as an indefinite, following Kadmon and Landman (1993) , Giannakidou (2001) , etc. Any in the Licensing Conditions in (64) refers to an NPI or a FCI in English, which includes any, anything, anybody, and
The definition of m-command, the broader sense of c-command, is as follows (Chomsky 1986:8) .
Facts from linguistic field study point to the relevance of m-command as a structural relationship, including subject extraposition in Italian. A c-commands B iff A does not dominate B and every X that dominates A also dominates B.
7
An anonymous reviewer raises a question as to how the example (i) below is grammatical, in which no does not c-command ever, based on the assumption that the Conditions in (64) extend to other nonveridical contexts besides adversative predicate constructions.
(i) ?The author of no linguistics article ever wants it to go unread.
As this paper focuses exclusively on the uses of any, an account of ever, another polarity item in English, will be the subject of my next research.
I have restated Chung's Free Choice Condition as (64ii) and incorporated it under the Licensing Conditions on Any. We saw in the previous section that the use of any in comparatives in (51a-b) goes against the non-episodicity Condition in (49ii). Consider how the use of any in (51a-b) follows from the Condition in (64ii).
The event expressed in (51a) is, by nature, a one-time event and thus is episodic, but any is licensed because free choice can be made from a relevant set of possible entities denoted by any. In other words, one can freely choose from the set an entity that satisfies the proposition in (51a). The same account holds for (51b).
Regarding the Condition in (64i), it is derived from the structural relationship between a non-veridical operator and any. Let us consider the structures of the following sentences. Consider the following sentences in this regard. 8 An anonymous reviewer raised the question of whether it results in grammaticality to replace anything with any of them in (63a), like (i) below.
(i) The defendant denied any of them.
Them may refer to the allegations in (i). Since denied as a nonveridical operator asymmetrically c-commands any in (i), the use of any in the above sentence is correctly judged grammatical in line with the Condition in (64i). Consider the following sentence with any from Laka (1990:175) . Therefore, the uses of any or anything in (70a-b) and (72) once again support the Condition in (64i), which is derived from the structural relationship between a nonveridical operator and any.
We note that the problematic cases for the other approaches in this paper can be handled via the Conditions in (64). Consider (8c), (38a-b), and (18a), repeated below as (74), (75a-b), and (76).
(74) *Bill saw anybody at no time.
(75) a. Press any key.
b. You can take any elevator to come to our office. Consider (77b), in which the use of any is ill-formed. As is indicated in (77a), perhaps is an example of a nonveridical operator, but any is not allowed in its scope in (77b). And the event expressed in (77b) is episodic. The unacceptability of any in (77b) follows from the Condition in (64ii) in that free choice cannot be made from a contextually relevant set of possible entities denoted by any for the entity that Paul talked to in the past. We note that there are many situations that will render the statement in (77b) false, for example, all those women situations that do not overlap with Paul's existence.
Several semanticists, including Kadmon and Landman (1993) , Lee and Horn (1994) , Giannakidou (2001) , analyze any as an indefinite, which must be interpreted in an intensional type. Following Giannakidou (2001:666) , I suggest that because of its intensional type, FC any will be grammatical only in contexts providing alternatives (worlds or situations). Thus the Condition in (64ii) is derived from the lexical semantics of any.
Therefore, the Condition in (64i) follows from the structural relationship between a non-veridical operator and any, and the Condition in (64ii) is derived from the lexical semantics of any. And I have argued for the univocal account of any. To conclude, it has been shown that the uses of any in all the examples in this paper can be adequately handled via the Licensing Conditions on Any in (64).
Conclusion
I have argued in this paper that any is an indefinite, generally following the lines of Kadmon and Landman (1993) , Lee and Horn (1994) , and Giannakidou (2001) .
Following the approaches by Giannakidou (2001:673) and Montague (1969) , I have argued that inherently negative predicates are verbs with negation (or a negation feature) inherent in them, and that they are nonveridical operators. 
